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Abstract
We estimate a structural life-cycle model of fertility and female labour sup-
ply and use it to evaluate the effects of a number of key family policy measures
based on data for Germany. Parental leave benefits, child benefits and subsidized
childcare are found to have substantial fertility effects. Without these measures,
completed fertility is estimated to be lower by 6%, 7%, and 10%, respectively. In-
come tax splitting, which is fiscally expensive, reduces female labour supply but
has a negligible effect on fertility.
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1 Introduction
Although spending on family policy measures is quite considerable in many countries,
relatively little is known about the effects of these measures, in particular with respect to
long-run fertility outcomes.1 Quasi-experimental studies on the effects of family policies
on fertility focus on the short-run effects (e.g. Cygan-Rehm, 2014; Raute, 2014). Likewise,
the structural models of Haan and Wrohlich (2011) and Stichnoth (2014) assume a one-
year decision horizon and therefore cannot analyze the effects on completed fertility.
In this paper, we develop a structural life-cycle model that allows us to quantify the
effects of parental leave benefits and three other key family policy measures (subsidized
childcare, child benefits, income tax splitting) on completed fertility. The model is es-
timated using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP); the simulation of
disposable incomes is based on a detailed representation of the tax-transfer system and
models the cost and availability of childcare based on new data from the SOEP extension
FiD (“Familien in Deutschland”).
Francesconi (2002) develops a dynamic model with endogenous fertility for the US. While
he focuses on women who are always married, we include all women and model marriage
as an exogenous stochastic process. Moreover, we consider not only the number, but also
the age of children, allow for stochastic fertility, model disposable income as opposed to
gross earnings and incorporate demand restrictions on the labour market by allowing for
(exogenous) job offer and break-up rates. Adda et al. (2011) allow for occupation-specific
wage-experience profiles and endogenize the initial occupation decision. However, they
study women who go through the German system of apprenticeship training, while we
also include women with tertiary education, a group that is important in the discussion
about (low) fertility. Importantly, Adda et al. focus on the decomposition of the career
costs of children and less on the evaluation of specific policies. The model by Slonimczyk
1In Germany, the country on which we focus here, spending on four key measures (parental leave
benefits, subsidized childcare, child benefits, income tax splitting) alone totals around 70 billion euros
per year (BMFSFJ, 2008).
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and Yurko (2014) is also closely related to ours; they study the effects of the maternity
capital policy in Russia.
2 The Model
We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of women’s fertility and employment choices
from their mid-20s (when education is typically completed) until the end of the fertile
phase. We assume a finite horizon of T = 20 discrete periods, each of which corresponds
to one year.
Women decide optimally in each period given their expectations about all future periods.
Fertility is stochastic in the model: the probability of becoming pregnant within one year
when trying to conceive depends on age; in addition, we allow for permanent infertility
as an absorbing state. We also take into account that women cannot always transit
between the employment states (not employed, part-time, full-time): whether a transition
is possible depends on state-specific job offer rates. Moreover, a woman may lose her
current job, with exogenous break-up rate.
Women anticipate that a reduction in their labour supply leads to a loss of work experience
and hence of future earnings opportunities. This drives the dynamics of the model and
the interaction between fertility and employment choices. In addition, fertility has an
impact on the formation and dissolution of couples, as the exogenous stochastic (Markov)
processes through which these are modelled depend (among other things) on the number
of children.
Let xit denote the vector of (discretized) state variables for woman i in period t. The
elements of the vector are the female employment status, the years of work experience
(0,1,4,12), the number of children (0,1,2,3) and the age of the youngest child (0,1,3,10),
as well as indicators for permanent infertility and for the presence of a partner.
Given the state variables and her expectations about future periods, the woman chooses
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a vector of actions ait: her desired employment state and whether she tries to conceive;
there are thus six possible choices.
She solves the dynamic programming problem given by
Vit (xit, θ) = max{ais}Tt

T∑
s=t
βs−tEt
[
u(xis, θ)|ait
] . (1)
Consumption equals disposable income in each period; the latter is simulated using a fairly
detailed representation of the German tax-transfer system (see the Online Appendix for
details).
The instantaneous utility function is assumed to be linear in its parameters θ. β is
the one-period discount factor. The expectation is with respect to the state transition
probabilities Prt(xi,t+s|xit,ait), which depend on the current state xit and on the action
ait and act as a constraint on the maximization problem.
A key component of the model is the accumulation of work experience. Each additional
year of full-time work is assumed to increase experience by one unit, while each year of
part-time work leads to an increase of 0.5 units. If a woman does not work, her work
experience remains constant. Wages increase with accumulated experience. As a result,
a career break after child birth is not only costly in terms of foregone current earnings,
but also affects future wage offers negatively. We assume that the logarithm of hourly
wages is a deterministic function of experience and experience squared.
For every parametrization θ, the dynamic programming problem is solved by backwards
induction. We take into account that there are utility components of each option that
are observed by the woman, but not by the econometrician. We assume these to be iid
extreme value. With this assumption, the policy function in our model is a vector of six
logistic choice probabilities.
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3 Data and Estimation
We use the 1995–2010 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)2 to estimate
the parameters of the exogenous stochastic processes (household formation and sepa-
ration, wage-experience profile).3 The age-specific fecundity rates (i.e., the probability
of giving birth within one year of unprotected sexual intercourse) and the probability
of being permanently infertile are calibrated based on data from the Fertility Source-
book (Khatamee and Rosenthal, 2002). We set the discount factor β to 0.98, a typical
value in the literature (e.g. Attanasio et al., 2008; Blundell et al., 2013). The annual job
break-up rate is set to 0.1. Concerning transition between employment states, we assume
that a woman who worked full-time in the previous period can keep her full-time job if
she wants to, unless she becomes involuntarily unemployed. By contrast, a woman who
worked part-time and decides to move to a full-time job will only be successful with a
probability of 70%.
The 18 parameters of the utility function are estimated based on 44 cross-sectional mo-
ments from the SOEP wave of 2010. The moments are based on the joint distribution of
the employment state and the number of children at four different ages (26, 32, 39, 45).
We consider women aged 25 to 29 and use the dynamic model to simulate trajectories
over 21 periods (including the initial period), i.e. until the end of their fertile years at
ages 45 to 49.4 The stochastic elements are introduced by drawing from the distributions
for the exogenous stochastic processes and from the vector of choice probabilities.
The objective function is the sum of squared differences between the sample moments
2The SOEP, which started in 1984, is a longitudinal survey of private households, with a rich set of
information on personal and household characteristics. See Wagner et al. (2007) for a detailed description.
3Results available from the authors upon request.
4We group several birth cohorts to increase the sample size. As expected given their young age (mean:
27, std.dev.: 1.4), relatively few of the 392 women (33%) are married in the initial period, and 60% do
not have children (22% have one child, 14% have two children, and 5% have more than two children).
45% of the children are below the age of three, 44% are between three and six, and 11% are older than
six. 30% of the women are not employed when we initially observe them, 24% work part-time and 46%
work full-time. They have on average 3.1 years of work experience; the mean wage offer is 11.5 euros per
hour.
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and the moments generated by the model. As we have closed-form expressions for the
choice probabilities, we can derive exact expressions for the model moments.
The estimated utility parameters and the deviations between observed and simulated
moments are documented in the Online Appendix. The model fits the sample moments
closely, with the exception of the share of women working part-time with one child at
ages 38 and 45, which we found more difficult to reproduce.
Our baseline simulation predicts that women aged 25 to 29 will have on average 1.87
children at the end of their fertile phase. 13% of women will remain childless, and 15%,
44% and 28% of women will give birth to one, two, and more than two children, respec-
tively. As shown in the Online Appendix, the simulation predicts a strongly negative
relationship between the number of children and the number of years spent in full-time
work.
4 Policy Experiments
Table 1 shows the results for our counterfactual policy experiments. Each row of the
table is from a separate experiment in which we switch off the corresponding measure
and keep the remaining rules of the 2012 tax-transfer-system in place. The interactions
within the system are taken into account. For instance, abolishing child benefits does not
lead to a one-to-one income reduction as some households may become eligible for social
assistance.
The model predicts that abolishing parental leave benefits, child benefits or subsidized
childcare would reduce completed fertility by 6%, 7%, and 10%, respectively, compared
with the baseline simulation. Income tax splitting, which is fiscally expensive, reduces
female labour supply but has a negligible effect on fertility.
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Table 1: Main results
Employment (years)
Completed Not Part- Full-
fertility employed time time
Income tax splitting -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.14
(0.004) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Child benefits -0.14 -0.22 -0.04 0.26
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Parental leave benefits -0.12 -0.25 -0.12 0.37
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Subsidized childcare -0.20 -0.08 -0.54 0.62
(0.04) (0.13) (0.09) (0.18)
Source: Own simulations based on SOEP 2010 and the tax-transfer system of 2012. T=21 periods,
each corresponding to one year. The simulation sample consists of 50 clones of each of the 392 women
in the original sample. The table shows absolute changes with respect to the baseline scenario. Each
line corresponds to a different scenario. Standard errors in parentheses based on 250 bootstrap runs.
5 Conclusion
Based on a structural life-cycle model of fertility and female labour supply, this paper has
estimated the effects of key family policy measures on completed fertility in Germany.
For some of the measures, such as parental leave benefits, these are the first estimates
of a long-run nature, as existing quasi-experimental studies focus on the short run and
cannot distinguish between timing effects and effects on completed fertility.
Future research should refine the estimates by using (administrative) data on complete
employment biographies and by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and
ability as well as for a more complex relationship between work experience and wages.
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A Appendix
A.1 Simulation of childcare costs and disposable income
We do not allow for savings, so consumption is equal to disposable income. The latter
is simulated based on a model of the German tax-transfer system. The starting point
of the simulation model is gross labour earnings. For the woman, these earnings depend
on her hourly wage and on whether she works full time or part time. We assume that
full-time work corresponds to 40 hours per week, while part-time work is taken to be
20 hours per week. If a husband is present, his earnings also enter the simulation of
disposable household income. We assume that the male partner works full time and has
gross earnings of 3749 euros per month, which corresponds to median earnings in 2010.
Social security contributions are deducted from each partner’s gross earnings.
Taxable income is obtained from gross earnings after deducting certain standard al-
lowances. Income tax is computed by plugging taxable income into a tax function. Note
that married couples in Germany can file a joint income tax declaration and benefit from
income tax splitting, i.e., the tax function is applied to the mean of both spouses’ taxable
income, and the tax payment is then doubled. As the income tax scheme is progressive,
this tends to make households better off than a system of individual taxation unless both
partners have exactly the same taxable income. By making both spouses’ marginal tax
rate equal, income tax splitting creates work disincentives for the secondary earner, in
most cases the woman. The disincentives are particularly strong at a threshold of 400 eu-
ros per month, below which earnings are exempt from income tax and employee’s social
security contributions.
Households may be entitled to a number of benefits and transfer payments. These usually
depend on household income, on the number and age of the children in the household,
and on the labour market states. For instance, certain transfers such as parental leave
benefits are conditional on working less than 30 hours per week, ruling out full-time
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employment. Likewise, payments from unemployment insurance (ALG I) can only be
received if a person is registered as unemployed. Social assistance (ALG II) payments
depend on the level of earnings, the number of persons in the household and the cost of
rent and heating, which we base on 2010 averages (by household size) published by the
German Federal Ministry of Labour.
A transfer that is of special interest in the context of family policy is parental leave
benefits. In 2007, Germany reformed its system of parental leave benefits. The previ-
ous means-tested child-rearing benefit (“Erziehungsgeld”) was replaced by “Elterngeld”,
which depends on (individual) earnings in the year before childbirth. In most cases, the
replacement rate is 67%. The benefit is capped at 1800 euros per month, but neverthe-
less represents a substantial transfer, especially compared to the previous child-rearing
benefit. To receive the benefit, at least one of the parents has to reduce working hours
below a threshold of 30 hours per week. The benefit is paid for a maximum of twelve
months.5
Child benefits and child tax allowance can be received for up to 25 years (and even longer
in a few exceptional cases that we neglect here, such as when the child is handicapped).
Since 2010, child benefits have amounted to 184 euros per month for the first two chil-
dren, 190 euros for the third child and 215 euros for additional children. Alternatively,
households can deduct a tax allowance of 7008 euros per child from their annual taxable
income, which is advantageous for households with a high income.
Another factor that is relevant when modelling fertility and employment decisions is
the cost and availability of childcare. Public childcare has long been in short supply
in Germany, in particular for children aged below 3. We assume that the amount of
external childcare required is a function of parents’ employment status. More precisely,
we make it dependent on min{hm,hf}, where h are weekly hours of work, and m and f
index the male and female partner. If the minimum is 0, no external childcare is needed.
5If both partners reduce their working time during at least two months, the benefit can be extended
to 14 months. We neglect this possibility here as our model assumes that the husband works full-time.
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If the minimum is 20 or 40 hours, parents need to organize the corresponding amount
of childcare for all children up to the age of 6. Assuming a fixed relationship between
parental working hours and childcare reduces the choice variables in the models, and
provides a reasonable approximation to observed patterns of childcare use.
For each household, we compute expected childcare costs for each choice alternative
using data from the 2010 SOEP extension “Families in Germany” (FiD, “Familien in
Deutschland”), which has detailed information on childcare use and costs. With a certain
probability, the household is “rationed”, i.e., cannot find a subsidized childcare slot. In
the data set, parents are asked why they do not send their child to public childcare, and
we define them to be rationed if they answer that they could not get a place, that the
distance was too great or that the opening hours do not correspond to their needs. We
estimate the rationing probability as a function of the region and the age of the child,
and then impute the probabilities to the SOEP households. As Table A.1 shows, the
probability of not finding an adequate slot in public childcare is higher in West Germany
and for younger children. Following Müller et al. (2013), we assume that parents who
cannot find a subsidized childcare slot have to rely on privately organized childcare, at a
rate of 6.40 euros per hour.
Table A.1: Probability of not having access to public childcare
Age 0-2 Age 3-6
East 10.2% 2.3%
West 15.8% 4.3%
Total 14.8% 4.0%
Source: Own calculations based on FiD 2010. Children aged 6 or below. N=4517. Households are
classified as not having access to public childcare if parents report that their child is not in public
childcare because they could not find a place, because the distance would be too great, or because
the opening hours do not correspond to their needs.
Parents who do have access to public childcare pay a (heavily subsidized) monthly fee,
which depends on household income, the age of the child, the region, whether siblings are
already in childcare, and whether the child is in part-time or full-time care. Note that
for some parents (e.g., with low income or in specific regions), parental fees can be zero.
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Estimation results (from Tobit models) are shown in Table A.2.
Table A.2: Parental fees for public childcare: estimation results
Part-time care Full-time care
Age < 3 56.2*** (14.1) 64.8*** (5.8)
Number of siblings in childcare -21.9*** (4.1) -28.4*** (4.4)
Net household income (1000 euros/month) 23.2*** (3.1) 17.0*** (3.8)
Single parent -23.6** (9.4) -32.0*** (10.5)
Intercept 39.7** (16.4) 149.1*** (24.3)
Dummies for Federal State Yes Yes
Number of observations 972 906
Of which left-censored 222 171
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.03
Source: Own calculations based on FiD 2010. Dependent variable: self-reported parental fees per
month. Results from Tobit models. Children aged 6 or below. Asymptotic standard errors (clustered
at the household level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.2 Additional tables and figures
Table A.3: Job offer rates
Employment in t+1
Choice: NE Choice: PT Choice: FT
Employ- Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
ment in t employed time time employed time time employed time time
Not employed 1 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0.3 0 0.7
Part-time 1 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 0.1 0.9×0.3 0.9×0.7
Full-time 1 0 0 0.1 0.9×0.7 0.9×0.3 0.1 0 0.9
Source: Own representation.
Table A.4: Sample moments targeted in the estimation
Age 26 Age 32
Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
employed time time employed time time
No children 6.6 12.3 37.4 2.4 3.6 19.2
One child 8.5 5.7 7.8 8.6 10.0 10.2
Two children 8.8 5.9 1.7 13.8 16.8 4.6
More than two children 4.0 0.9 0.4 5.0 5.2 0.6
Age 38 Age 45
Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
employed time time employed time time
No children 0.8 3.0 12.7 2.0 2.8 10.8
One child 6.1 11.7 9.8 3.5 9.1 8.9
Two children 8.0 23.0 8.1 7.3 20.4 15.8
More than two children 6.9 7.3 2.6 5.2 10.1 4.1
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2010. All values in percent.
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Table A.5: Deviations between sample moments and simulated moments
Age 26 Age 32
Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
employed time time employed time time
No children 0.2 -1.2 -1.7 1.1 1.3 -0.4
One child 0.1 0.6 1.7 -0.7 -0.9 -0.3
Two children -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -1.4 0.3 0.6
More than two children 1.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 1.3
Age 38 Age 45
Not Part- Full- Not Part- Full-
employed time time employed time time
No children 1.1 -0.5 -1.8 -0.7 -1.5 -2.0
One child -1.4 -5.8 -1.0 -1.1 -6.7 0.8
Two children 3.6 0.1 2.8 -0.4 1.6 0.6
More than two children 0.5 0.2 2.4 1.7 0.9 6.8
Source: Own simulations based on SOEP 2010. The simulation sample consists of 50 clones of each
of the 392 women in the original sample. All values are in percentage points. Each entry corresponds
to the simulated moment minus the observed moment.
Figure A.1: Model fit
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Source: Own calculations/simulations based on SOEP 2010. The simulation sample consists of 50 clones
of each of the 392 women in the original sample.
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Table A.6: Estimated utility parameters
Coefficient (Std.err.)
Disposable income 1 (.)
One child -378.0 (51.7)
Two children -1382.1 (153.0)
More than two children -2881.4 (164.2)
Partner * children > 0 294.4 (127.9)
Part-time -78.9 (24.9)
Not employed -688.7 (152.1)
Part-time * one child -1881.1 (99.7)
Part-time * two children 827.2 (92.2)
Part-time * more than two children 782.4 (100.7)
Part-time * age youngest child < 3 -2111.3 (133.6)
Part-time * age youngest child ∈ [3,10) 2813.0 (103.0)
Part-time * age youngest child ≥ 10 -663.9 (97.7)
Not employed * one child -464.9 (94.2)
Not employed * two children 515.1 (144.2)
Not employed * more than two children 1720.0 (196.3)
Not employed * age youngest child < 3 1114.8 (145.3)
Not employed * age youngest child ∈ [3,10) 1562.0 (235.6)
Not employed * age youngest child ≥ 10 -6203.4 (100.1)
Source: SOEP 2010. N=392. Standard deviations from 250 bootstrap runs shown in parentheses,
using the point estimates for the original sample as the starting value in each case. Disposable
income is divided by the number of adults in the households. The coefficient on disposable income is
normalized to 1.
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Table A.7: Baseline simulation
Employment (years)
Children Not Part- Full-
Share per woman employed time time
Without children 13.1% 0 2.65 3.74 14.62
(0.99) (0.05) (0.50) (0.51)
One child 14.9% 1 5.83 5.93 9.24
(0.88) (0.47) (0.32) (0.50)
Two children 44.1% 2 6.83 10.07 4.11
(1.78) (0.42) (0.38) (0.24)
More than two children 27.9% 3 9.32 7.71 3.98
(1.75) (0.52) (0.56) (0.51)
Total 100% 1.87 5.42 7.32 8.26
(0.03) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22)
Source: Own simulations based on SOEP 2010 and the tax-transfer system of 2012. T=21 periods,
each corresponding to one year. The simulation sample consists of 50 clones of each of the 392 women
in the original sample. Standard errors in parentheses based on 250 bootstrap runs.
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